Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence
姚加权，暨南大学金融学教授，博导。新加坡南洋理工大学金融学博士，研究方向包括金融科技、数字经济、非结构化大数据计量经济学和自然语言处理，论文发表于Review of Financial Studies、Management Science、Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis、《管理世界》、《管理科学学报》等国内外权威期刊，以及计算机顶会WWW和KDD。担任International Journal of Finance Economics (ABS三星)副主编。指导的学生论文曾获第三届全国优秀金融硕士学位论文。
ABSTRACT
Trust between parties should shape contract design: if parties were suspicious about each others’ reaction to unplanned events, they might pay higher negotiation costs to complete contracts ex-ante. Using a unique sample of U.S. consulting contracts, novel text-based-analysis measures of contract completeness, and a negative shock to trust between shareholders/managers (principals) and consultants (agents) staggered across space and over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Non-competes, details about equity compensation, indemnification, termination, and confidentiality clauses are added to contracts after trust drops.
主持人
杜博文
澳门新葡京app-新葡京下载
助理教授
香港城市大学金融学博士
时间
2024年5月31日（周五）
下午4:15-5:30
地点
湖南大学财院校区-水上教学楼211
